In this chapter we review economic, geographical and historical literature on the spatial allocation of the economic activity in Russia. We distinguish three main factors which shaped Russian economic geography, namely physical geography, policy of the state and historical circumstances. We discuss how these factors affected the location of population and economic activity from the 16 th century to the present time. We consider historical trends in population geography, industrial and migration policy during the Imperial and Soviet eras, and the changes in spatial economy of Russia during the post-Soviet period.
Introduction
This chapter deals with Russian economic geography and how it evolved from the time of formation of Russian centralized state to the present day. We review economic, geographical and historical literature on the subject and discuss factors which affect the spatial allocation of population and economic activity in Russia. We distinguish three such factors. The first one is physical geography: location, climate, size, and other features of the country's territorial endowment. The second factor is the state policy of regional development, which was shaped by the trade-off between the desire for the frontier development and the costs associated with it. The third factor is national history, and the circumstances of past regional development.
Russia is unique in climate, size, and location. Russian Federation is the largest country in the world, taking up 11.5% of the world's landmass. Yet the majority of this vast land area is virtually uninhabited. 65% of Russian territory is exposed to continuous or sporadic permafrost. Average January temperature in Moscow is -10°C, 1 but over 90% of Russia's territory is even colder (see Figure 1 ). Accessibility is another problem. On the northern part of the Eurasian landmass most of the rivers flow from south to north. There are no cheap transcontinental water transportation routes from Europe to Asia, costly land transport is practically the only option. Most of Russia's territory is not only cold, but also remote from the world markets and from the main population centers in Russia itself.
Physical geography presents natural constraints to the distribution of economic activity over the territory. Given such climate and land endowment, it is not surprising that Russian population is concentrated in the areas with relatively favorable natural conditions. Figure 2 shows population density. The eastern part of the country and a narrow strip along its southern border to the east of the Ural mountains, which together constitute less than 20% of its total land endowment, host the majority of population. But even there population density is generally low relative to international standards. It is an unusual combination: Russia's population is quite concentrated, if we consider all of its vast territory; at the same time it is still sparse compared to the majority of other countries.
This sparsity of population and economic activity on the huge territory is one of the key features of Russian economic geography.
Physical geography is also an important driver of the spatial evolution of Russian economy. Natural resources compose a bulk of the value of the Russian frontier -Siberia and the Far East. The desire to exploit them caused spatial expansion of the Russian Empire and has been always an essential determinant of state policy. Figure 1 shows the location of major natural resources and January isotherms on the territory of the former Soviet Union. It is apparent that most of highly valuable resources: not only fossil fuels, diamonds, and lucrative deposits of various nonferrous metals, but timber and furs (a resource of major importance in the imperial and pre-imperial times), are located far from where people live, in the regions with hostile environment, far away from the major communication routes. Over the centuries this cost-benefit trade-off of the frontier development was resolved differently.
Yet the common feature is that the state has always been a major decision-maker with limited market mechanisms of allocation of resources. The Russian Empire through most of its history tried to strengthen military presence in the East and South-East. The Soviet Union resettled population and implemented massive investment programs into Siberian and Far East regions. Both approaches have left a legacy in the economic geography of Russia that we observe today. The rest of the article discusses what we know from the works of historians, economists, and geographers of how physical geography, history and policy affected the spatial economy of Russia.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the evolution of population density and migration policies in the Russian Empire. Then, section 3 discusses Soviet industrial policy and its impact on the distribution of economic activities across regions. Section 4 focuses on cities and urbanization history. Section 5 reviews the evidence on the changes in the spatial structure of Russian economy, migration flows, and regional inequality after the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
Historical population geography of Russia
The main theme in the spatial evolution of Russia is that it has been always a frontier state, and its history is mainly a story of territorial expansion. From the 16th century to the late 19th century the Russian Empire was incorporating new territories. Largest territorial acquisitions were to the east and to the south of the historical center: Moscow. The changes in the spatial allocation of population followed the same south-eastern vector.
Population history: an overview
By the early 16th century Moscow princedom established its leadership as a new center of the country that unified all Russian princedoms. At that time, Russians occupied only the north-west of the modern territory of the country, to the north of the Oka river and to the west of the Urals mountains. In 1550 total population did not exceed 6.5 million, population density was extremely low (see (Moon 1997) ), only about 2.3 persons per square kilometer. Poor soils and weak agricultural techniques limited population growth on this territory, while much richer soils of black earth regions to the south of Moscow remained sparsely populated because of the permanent threat of nomad raids.
Over the next four centuries, the Russian Empire dramatically expanded in the western, southern and eastern directions. In the south and south-east, Russia gradually defeated various nomadic khanates and conquered a wide steppe region of Black earth lands, Middle and Low Volga, Don and North Caucasus, known as "wild field" (dikoe pole) before the annexation. The Urals, Siberia and the Far East -huge and very sparsely populated territories -were gained in the next waves of imperial expansions. Common among all these territories was low density of indigenous population.
It was, essentially, a wild frontier. Centuries later it would become an integral part of the Russian Federation's economic core that (Bradshaw and Prendergrast 2005) called "a new Russian heartland" 2 Relatively well populated at the moment of annexation were only the new provinces in the West, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, i.e. roughly the territories which became new independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Table 1 presents population history of Russia since the first household tax census of 1678 (the first date for which reasonably accurate population figures are available) till the beginning of the 20th century. Figures 3 and 4 give four snapshots of population density throughout the history (we use historical maps because of the administrative borders problem but show density only for provinces which belongs to the modern Russian Federation).
In 1678 total population of Russia was about 11.2 million people. Population density was the highest in the center region in the provinces around Moscow. At this time, the Black Earth region was already colonized for more than a century, but still underpopulated relative to the Centre, because of an active threat of nomad raids from the Khanate of Crimea, that remained present till the late 17th century. Rapid population growth in the Black Earth belt started only in the 18th century. Middle Volga belt saw a significant increase in population in 19th century. Siberia, despite all the abundant agricultural land in its southern parts, was practically empty until the mid-19th century. Only at the end of the 19th century the wave of population density increase reached southern Urals and Siberiathis was three centuries after these territories were annexed by the Russian Empire. The general direction of population diffusion toward the south-east is well explained by the economic incentives in a primarily agrarian Russian economy. Accessible regions with good climate and fertile lands saw faster population growth. However, the speed of migration was very slow. 
Migration policy in the Russian Empire
Political and institutional framework of Russian serfdom prevented free movement of population.
By the time of emancipation reform in 1861, more than a third of the population were serfs, i.e. private property of the gentry. Another third of the population were state serfs who were bound to their settlements and the land. Serfs had no legal rights to act on their own, and in particular to choose place of living without consent of their lords. But not only serfs were restricted in their geographical mobility. Other social groups, including gentry (who had no right to leave the country freely, for example) faced various legal restrictions on where they could live (see, for example, (Ivanova and Zheltova 2010) ). Table 2 reports the levels of internal migration inflow into frontier recipient regions in late 17th early 20th centuries. Although these migration flows might seem significant in absolute numbers, in relative terms they never exceeded 0.2% of the total population per average year during any period.
Before the emancipation of serfs in 1861 this number was below 0.1%. (Domar 1970) , the serfdom system in Russia was introduced in the late 16th century as a reaction to the sharp decrease in labor-to-land ratio after the annexation of the new territories in the east and the depopulation in the center caused by the series of wars and by the domestic policy of Ivan the Terrible. The desire to keep labor cheap was so entrenched, that various migration restrictions survived even after the serfs emancipation.
Other reasons for the lack of population mobility were high transportation costs and poor access to credit. In a poor country it was difficult for many to finance the move. The history of the late Russian Empire after 1896, when free resettlement into Siberia was introduced, illustrates the scale of the problem. When the construction of Trans-Siberian railroad opened relatively cheap access to the Asian part of the country, migration flow to Siberia doubled. When Stolypin reform of 1906 eased peasants liquidity constraints, granting them the right to withdraw from the commune and to sell one's share of land, migration further intensified. (Chernina, Dower and Markevich 2010) estimate that Stolypin titling reform can explain at least 15% of all migration intensity thereafter.
The last years of the empire between Stolypin reform and the October revolution, is a unique period in Russian history. It is essentially the only time in history when geographical mobility of population was not hindered by the state. The result of this freedom was the wave of peasant migration to Siberia, the redistribution of labor to the areas where agricultural land was still abundant. The Soviet period was marked by further movement of population and economic activity to the northern and eastern parts of the country. The share of population in Eastern Siberia and Far
East relative to the population of the whole Soviet union increased from 3.3% in 1926 to 5.9 % in 1985 (Rybakovskii 1985 p. 57 ). Yet these changes were no longer dictated by market-based incentives of independent agents, but by the ideology of the Soviet state and the system of central planning as well as massive evacuation of population from the European part of the country to the East caused by the shock of the Second World War.
Industrial policy in the USSR
Seven decades of central planning in the Soviet Union produced the dramatic changes in the spatial structure of Russian economy. (Hill and Gaddy 2003) presents a detailed account of how atypical Russia's economic geography is: an unprecedented share of population is located in severe climatic environments, isolated by the distance from the major world markets. The Soviet government put enormous resources into moving millions of people to Siberia, the North, and the Far East and developing permanent settlements there. During Stalin's industrialization, GULAG prisoners were used to overcome the scarcity of labor in the remote areas. Later, a system of pay incentives was used to attract voluntary migrants there. Overall, the result of the 70 years of the Soviet rule was a major shift of population, infrastructure, and capital to the eastern parts of the country. In this section we discuss Soviet regional policy, its ideological roots, implementation and consequences.
Soviet location principles and practice
General principles of resource allocation in the USSR provided ideological foundations for Soviet regional policy. (Rodgers 1974 ) offers a very broad classification of these principles. The first group of principles -"growth-oriented" -were to ensure what was viewed as efficient exploitation of natural resources. In the Soviet planning environment this essentially implied locating manufacturing facilities to minimize transportation costs. Plants had to be either near primary resources or near consumers. The second group of principles -"equality-oriented" -dictated that economic growth has to be geographically balanced. Capital investments had to go to the relatively underdeveloped regions. Finally, the third group of principles claimed the priority of strategic considerations: manufacturing facilities had to be located to maximize the country's defense potential.
These principles had the following implications for the regional structure of the Soviet economy.
The principle of exploiting natural resources with the minimal transportation costs alone dictated the shift of the manufacturing facilities toward the east, to Siberia -this is where the resources are.
Many researchers in the 1960s-1980s wrote that this principle did not violate economic rationality and should not have resulted in additional distortions, because, after all, it strives to minimize costs (see, for example (Dyker 1983) ). However, in the market economy an agent deciding on location looks at a multitude of factors apart from transportation costs. He takes into account factor markets In sum, Soviet location principles should have produced a spatial allocation of economic activity in the USSR that is skewed to the east compared to what would happen without the influence of the socialist state. The question is, to what extent were these principles indeed followed? (Dienes 1972) calculates value added and productivity of capital and labor by Soviet regions. He shows that investments decisions were indeed biased toward peripheral regions while productivity there was lower than in historical center. He points out that development of the sparsely populated East comes with a very high cost of labor. In the 1960s, i.e. after the system of GULAG forced labor was abolished, the state faced substantial outmigration from the Urals and Western Siberia and had to offer a substantial wage premium to attract labor migrants there. At the same time, substantial capital investments went into the Soviet republics in Central Asia, where labor was relatively abundant, but productivity of capital was below average. Dienes concludes that the decision to invest into underdeveloped regions was not driven by profit maximization (not even by the profit calculated in the Soviet system of prices), but followed the ideological line toward regional equality. becomes stable: in all these years the gain in industrial production is biggest in the regions east of the Urals.
Population migration had followed eastern industrial investments pattern, in general. However, after
Stalin's death and a shift to more liberal labor policy the Soviet government periodically faced labor shortages and even outmigration from regions of mass investments. In particular, the Urals and West
Siberia saw intensive outmigration flows in the 1960s and the first half of 1970s, because living standards there were worse than in the European part of the country. With the help of investments into infrastructure and wage premia the government managed to overcome this tendency in the late 1970s (Rybakovskii 1988, pp. 58-64) .
The distortions in the spatial structure of the economy and the allocation of population by the end of the Soviet era were quite large. (Mikhailova 2004 smaller than what the Soviet system had produced.
The legacy of the USSR is not simply a shift of productive resources into the extreme climatic conditions, but also a decrease in the spatial concentration of population. As people moved to the east, they were spreading out across the territory, moving away from the world markets and the traditional historical "core" of the country. At the same time, through the 20th century spatial distribution of productive resources in other countries was becoming more and more concentrated, closer to major ports and trade routes.
Spatial concentration
In this section we discuss whether Russian population and industry are more or less concentrated than in other countries. ( Not only Russian population is spread out over the territory, but Russian industry also tends to be more equally distributed than in other countries. We calculated (Ellison and Glaeser 1997) dartboard indices for 2-digit SIC industries in Soviet Russia in 1988 5 to compare with the same indices for the USA (calculated by (Rosenthal and Strange 2001) ). The benchmark is the population distribution,
i.e., if we distribute industrial establishments across regions randomly, with the probability density equal to the regional population share, the expectation of the Ellison-Glaeser index for such an industry would be zero. Table 3 compares spatial concentration of industries in Russia and the USA.
Russian 2-digit SIC industries were on average less geographically concentrated than industries in the USA. This is what we would expect as an effect of the Soviet regional balanced growth policy.
Surprisingly, in the Russia there were several industries that for which the calculated concentration indices turned out negative (although very close to zero). They were distributed more equally than random distribution over population would produce, in expectation.
Only a few of the industries were more concentrated than in the US: wood, paper, machinery, primary metal. Also, printing and publishing were more concentrated in Russia -this is not surprising for an autocratic regime. Higher concentration of miscellaneous manufacturing in Russia could be explained by the absence of small businesses that normally produce a variety of custom consumer products.
Consumer goods (apparel, leather, furniture, and also tobacco) were very dispersed in the Soviet times. In market economies, an important driver of concentration in consumer goods are horizontal spillovers related to human capital. Exchange of fashion ideas, technological trends, common labor pool make co-location beneficial for the firms. For the Soviet planning system, fashion was of a secondary importance to achieving regional sufficiency in the supply of consumer goods as a part of 4 According to Campante and Do (2009) , Russia is either 5th or close 2d by sparsity, depending on the weighting scheme. The least concentrated is the USA, but this is primarily because index is centered around capital city -in this case Washington, D.C., which is not the most populous city in the USA. 5 Data are from the Industrial Census of the Soviet Union, 1988. Indices were calculated for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, the same territory that became Russian Federation after the breakup of the USSR.
overall doctrine of balanced regional growth. Instead of clustering, consumer good production was allocated relatively uniformly. China provides another interesting comparison. Chinese industries tend to be less geographically concentrated than industries in developed economies due to the legacy of planned system and continuing local protectionism (see (Lu and Tao 2009) Table   5 in (Lu, 2010) and Table 2a in (Lu and Tao, 2009 )) -both figures are higher than for 1988 Russia. 
Russian urban system
This section discusses size, location, and functions of Russian cities. We start with the historical account of how urban system in Russia emerged, and how through the centuries state policies affected its development. We then turn to the main features of Russian cities and the spatial distribution of urban population today.
Urbanization history
The first major overhaul of the urban system in the Russian Empire happened when in 1775 empress Catherine the Great gave the status of a city to 216 rural settlements for the purpose of creating new administrative centers ((Le Donne 1982) and (Le Donne 1983)). There was notable deficit of "real" cities -centers of industry and trade -on wide Russian spaces. Even the population centers that already had city status prior to the reform were often no more than large rural settlements, whose residents held agrarian occupations predominantly. However, centralized governance structure demanded administrative centers, and they had to be scattered over large territory. And so the number of cities had to increase, if only in name. The sizable growth of urban population and increased importance of cities did not come until late 19th century, together with rapid industrialization.
A second wave of rapid changes in the urban system in the Russian Empire came after the Soviet period saw a number of cases of "entry" into the urban system or explosive growth of small settlements that happened when cities were created practically from scratch for the purpose of (Gang and Stuart 1999) list the residential restrictions that were imposed onto the large cities in the USSR and find that these restrictions were only marginally effective in reducing the rate of city growth as compared to a similar city with no such restrictions. We do not, however, know the counterfactual: it is possible that those large cities were inherently more attractive and would have grown faster than the average in the absence of restrictions.
With all the effort to restrict the growth of large cities and to favor medium ones, did the Soviet planners manage to make the city size distribution more uniform? (Clayton and Richardson 1989) describe Soviet attitudes and policies toward city location and size, analyze the city-size distribution, and come to the conclusion that it is overly equal, i.e. there is too little variation in city sizes. (Iyer 2003) similarly analyzes the changes in city-size distribution in Russian Federation during the last Soviet years and in transition. She finds increasing variation in Russian city sizes once market forces are allowed to operate.
Size and location of Russian cities
What are the main distinct features of Russian urban system today? (Hill and Gaddy 2003) discuss extensively how Russian cities do not fit a common empirical regularity: the Zipf's law. City-size distribution fits the Zipf's law if a relationship between the log of city rank (rank is 1 for Moscow, 2
for St. Petersburg, etc) and the log of city population size is approximately linear with the slope of minus one. This relationship holds for a majority of countries (see (Rosen and Resnik 1980) ).
Russia does not fit the Zipf's law in the range of cities ranked roughly third to eighth: by the law the third-largest city has to have about 3-3.5 million residents ( Of course, the Zipf's law is not indicative of economic efficiency in the distribution of population across space. To this day, there is no theory that could derive the rank-size rule from the microeconomic foundations. Failure of the Zipf's law to hold merely indicates that Russia has fewer leading cities than other countries at a similar level of economic development.
From the cross-section of countries (Henderson 2000 ) estimated how urban primacy, i.e. the share of urban population in the largest metropolitan area, is connected to the economic growth. His results suggest that for countries like Russia (urban population at around 100 million and GDP per capita at around $8000) the highest growth rates occur when urban primacy is around 20%. The share of Moscow agglomeration, by most generous estimates, is below 15%. In other words, Russian urban population is too spread out.
Sparsity of population is even more pronounced when we consider the shares of several large cities, not just the biggest one. Russia has too few metropolises, its second-tier cities are too small, and there are too many small and medium cities inherited from imperial and Soviet past. Fewer people live relatively close to the major agglomerations than in comparable countries. Essentially, we are now faced with the same problem that Catherine the Great saw in the 18th century: a majority of 1044 Russian cities are not truly cities. They are too small and too isolated to generate agglomeration benefits, and in essence, are rural centers. Contemporary measures of urbanization in Russia are somewhat misleading. Many people are formally defined as urban residents. But formal definition of an urban settlement has nothing to do with economic benefits that we usually associate with cities -agglomeration effects, i.e. advantages of being located close to many other economic agents.
A separate set of problems that came into the light during the global financial crisis of [2008] [2009] concern the "mono-cities" in Russia. The term refers to the cities and towns with a dominant employer. Many of such cities suffered severely due to the downturn in their dominant industry.
Unfortunately, the academic research into the mono-cities in Russia is quite scarce. (Zubarevich, 2010) presents the most complete description of the Russian mono-cities, their problems and political issues to date.
In (WDR 2009) an agglomeration index was calculated. It is equal to the share of population that lives within 60 minutes of travel time to the major population center or in a city of at least 50 thousand people and at least as dense as 150 people per square km. This index is a measure of urbanization that is comparable across countries and independent from the official settlement status, criteria for which may differ across countries. For Russia, this index is only about 65%, below official urbanization rate (73%), and way below the average for OECD countries (around 78%).
Moreover, World Bank criteria of an urban area are rather generous. (Zubarevich 2003) , (Nefedova, Treyvish and Pallot 2010) noted that only Russian cities and towns of population roughly above 250 thousand people fare relatively well in modern economic conditions and have potential to work as vehicles of modernization. For smaller cities the benefits of agglomeration are weak to none. Yet the share of Russian population that lives in or around cities of 250 thousand inhabitants is below 50%.
As of today, Russia is still under-urbanized and under-concentrated. With further economic development, the share of population in the major agglomerations will likely be increasing.
Post-Soviet migration and changes in regional inequality
After the breakup of the Soviet Union and with the start of economic transition the incentives of agents changed drastically. Massive Soviet subsidies to the lagging and remote areas stopped. Soviet restrictions to population migration were gradually eliminated through the 1990s. Enterprises had to restructure and learn to survive in market environment. Labor and capital faced new incentives engendered by the market environment and responded to them with migration. In this section we talk about how the spatial economy of Russia changed during the transition years.
Post-Soviet migration
One of the drastic changes of transition was complete reversal of the direction of population migration flows. The drastic reduction of subsidies to the northern regions and the currency crisis in the beginning of the 1990s resulted in a massive outflow of people from remote areas. Essentially, the people who were attracted by the Soviet economic incentives in the North, returned to the "mainland" once the system collapsed. (Heleniak 1999) estimates that through the 1990s about 8% of population of "The Far North" (which includes northern parts of European Russia, Siberia, the Far East, and Sakhalin, but does not include southern Siberia or Far Eastern south) left for the other regions. However, their preferred destinations were not in the warmer western parts of Russia, but in southern Siberia and Maritime province. By the end of the 1990s migration outflow from the Far North has decreased significantly. Overall, out-migration from the Far North during the transition years was marginal compared to in-migration of the Soviet years. It is fair to say that there is no trend to reverse the Soviet distortions estimated by (Mikhailova, 2004) , or at least this will not happen in a foreseeable future. (Andrienko and Guriev 2004) investigated pairwise migration flows between all Russian regions and found that migration does follow market incentives: people go to the regions that offer higher incomes and better quality of life, however the intensity of migration is low. Moreover, they found that for the poorest regions differential economic incentives do not produce a significant migration outflow. They proposed a hypothesis of poverty trap: people in the poorest regions simply lack the resources to finance the move. However, today, after a decade of growing incomes, we still do not see an increase in interregional mobility.
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The 2002 Census data show that population flows into large cities, leaving small settlements, but the size of these inflows are modest. Among the agglomerations, only Moscow experiences significant and robust migration inflow. Geographical distribution of population is changing. But low population mobility implies that the change is very slow. To this day, the spatial economy of Russia is still very "Soviet".
Regional inequality
Issues of regional inequality are of interest primarily from the practical policymaking point of view.
During Soviet era, the equalization of regional development levels was postulated as a goal in itself and on ideological grounds. Theoretical models of economic geography (see, for example (Ottaviano et al. 2002) ) typically predict an inverse u-shaped relationship between regional inequality and the size of transportation costs (which in historical context proxies for economic development). Thus, economic growth may be associated with either decreasing or increasing inequality, and it is not possible to make a definitive normative statement about the desirable level of inequality. On the other hand, regional inequality contributes to the inequality among people in incomes and standard of living, and thus it is a pressing social issue. In modern Russia, interregional budgetary transfers are one of the factors that are used to smooth interregional income inequality, but the thorough discussion of Russian fiscal federalism is beyond the scope of this chapter. Here we restrict ourselves to the review of the literature documenting and measuring regional inequality After the decades of Soviet equalizing policies, the early years of transition to market economy brought about a sharp increase in inequality among Russian regions. Inequality has not decreased since. This is true whether one considers σ-convergence or β-convergence, and true not only for income per capita, but generally for the majority of economic indicators.
Regions experience σ-convergence if a chosen aggregate measure of inequality (Gini coefficient, standard deviation, etc) declines over time. Tests for β-convergence involve estimating a growth regression such as:
where g it -growth rate of region i in period t, y i;t-1 -prior income level and x it is a vector of controls added when investigating conditional convergence. Negative estimated value of β parameter points to regional convergence. It implies that rich regions grow slower, poor regions catch up. Positive value of β implies divergence. (Carluer 2005) gives a general picture of how variance of regional income per capita had been changing over the years. In the late Soviet period (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) ) the gap between the lagging and leading regions did not change significantly, no convergence could be observed. A transitional shock of 1991-1992 increased regional inequality sharply, and it stayed roughly the same until 1999.
The same pattern persisted into the 2000s. (Lugovoi et al. 2007) Studies of β-convergence paint the same picture. (Carluer 2005) finds weak β-convergence in 1985-1991, and 1992-1999, and divergence in 1991-1992 , but none of the estimated coefficients is statistically significant. (Lugovoi et al. 2007 ) also found that unconditional β-convergence is absent.
Conditional convergence (with a half-convergence period of 24 years) is present. However, some of the characteristics, which authors condition on, depend themselves on regional growth perspectives: financial aid, status of depressed region. 
Drivers of regional growth and investment
What are the factors that drive regional growth in the Russian case? For 1996 -2004 (Lugovoi et al. 2007 ) name region's specialization in fossil fuels (through both the direct effect of growth in that industry and through income spillovers during the period of high oil prices), favorable location and good transport infrastructure, and neighbor effects. Regions benefit from having fast-growing neighbors. (Kholodilin et al. 2009 ) also find positive spillover effects from the rich regions to their neighbors. In the small circle of relatively rich regions located near each other convergence could be observed. Interestingly, (Carluer 2005) finds the opposite for somewhat earlier data range (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) : metropolises and regional centers do relatively well in transition, but regions in the vicinity of them suffer more than those far away. He calls this "a vampire effect" of capitals. During the early years of transition, centripetal forces were dominating: metropolises were winning the competition for scarce investments, therefore economic activity concentrated in agglomerations.
Later, centrifugal forces strengthened, and positive spatial spillovers started to work.
Another relevant strand of literature examines the changes to industrial structure, investment, and production reallocation in Russia during transition. (Rytchkov and Shevyakhova 2004) start with a formal model to derive a composite variable they call NEGF (new economic geography factor), which is a linear approximation of the theory-based measure of market potential. They found that NEGF has predictive power for the changes in Russian regional industrial structure during [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] . Firms change location and follow market potential. (Brown et al. 2008) analyze how entry of new firms depends on market potential. For a given location (raion) they construct a weighted average of the size of the markets (proxied by population) that can be reached from it. This measure of market potential is a function of geographical location (in relation to the other locales) and of existing transportation infrastructure. They found that new firms overwhelmingly favor regions with good market access. Moreover, as the authors show, in Russia the measure of market potential is strongly correlated with a number of inherent geographical characteristics such as January temperature, permafrost prevalence, distance to port, distance to the capital, etc. Even if firms are primarily driven by the agglomeration factors such as desire to be near other economic agents (consumers, suppliers), as the result, they locate in the regions with favorable location fundamentals. The general conclusion is quite pessimistic with regard to lagging regions. In Russia today successful development of a region is mainly a function of geographical location. Two factors of geography define economic prospects. First factor is natural resource endowment -the lucky few regions that have lucrative natural resource deposits are richer. Second factor is market potential: how easily accessible from the region are main population centers, ports, transportation nodes. First factor is predetermined by nature. Second factor can be influenced by people through improvements in transportation infrastructure. It is possible to improve accessibility of depressed regions, but as (Brown et al. 2008 ) calculate, such policy is not optimal from the point of view of Russia as a whole. The improvements in infrastructure would bring the largest benefit in the regions where economic activity is already concentrated.
Conclusion
Spatial structure of the economy is slow to change, especially in Russia, where, as we know from the evidence of the last 20 years, mobility of population is still rather limited. This means that in order to understand Russian spatial economy, we have to understand its evolution in historical perspective.
The biggest factor that explains the allocation of economic activity in Russia today is the legacy of the Soviet system. With respect to this legacy, we know a lot about how and when the productive factors were reallocated across the territory. What we know less about is why the Soviet authorities Another set of questions has to do with regional policy. One of the features of Russia's spatial economy is its sparsity. There are too few people spread over too much territory. As a part of the global trend, and as a reversal of the Soviet misallocations, we should expect further concentration of economic activity in favorably located agglomerations in Russia. But this means that some territories would be losing population and stagnating. (Dienes 2002 ) describes what he calls "Archipelago Russia": the striking contrasts that exist between integrated and vibrant cites on one hand and underdeveloped "dead space" or glubinka in between. Yet these contrasts are likely to deepen even more in the future. Russia now faces a typical problem of a diverse country, where leading regions significantly outpace lagging areas in terms of gross product and quality of life. The problem of inequality in Russia and the social problems that ensue, have a regional aspect. The most important determinant of a person's economic prospects in Russia is a place of residence. Coupled with low interregional mobility, this presents a growing problem: how to effectively help people in the lagging regions without subsidizing an inefficient spatial allocation of productive resources? One of the obvious measures is to encourage migration, to reduce institutional and economic barriers to population mobility.
